Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Prosentential Theory, philosophy: the prosentential theory is a variant of the theory of truth presented by D.L. Grover, J. Camp and N. Belnap (“A prosentential theory of truth, Philosophical Studies”, 27, 73-124, 1975). Instead of the truth predicate "true", a whole sentence "that is true" is accepted, through which a questionable sentence could be supplemented theoretically in order to reaffirm its truth. The decisive point here is that in this way truth is not attributed as a property of sentences. See also redundancy theory, theory of truth, paratactic analysis, deflationism, inflationism, disquotationalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Grover, D. L. on Prosentential Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 315 Prosentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: (modification of Ramsey's approach) thesis: if we enrich everyday language slightly with propositional quantification (quantification over propositions), then we can express everything without a truth predicate ("true") that we can express with it. See T-predicate, truth predicate. I 324 Prosentential Theory/CGB: variables do not need to be connected with predicates in prosentences. Everyday Language: everyday language already has prosentences, e.g. "it is true", "that's true". Relative pronoun: a relative pronoun is only possible with individual variables - not with propositional variables (they have a sentence position). Solution: a solution offers the cross-reference - then a variable in the prosentence does not have to be connected to a verb. I 325 True/Ramsey: "true" does not have to attribute a property. CGB: true may be a fragment of the prosentence. I 334 Prosentential/CGB: thesis: we want to say in the spirit of Ramsey that all speech about the truth can be understood so that it only involves the prosentential use of "that's true". I 349 Prosentence/CGB: a prosentence must not be split (to take "the" as an anaphora - otherwise also "is true" stands alone and is then no longer referring, but characterizing (property-attributing CGBVs)). I 351 True: "true" becomes characterizing when "they" is construed as an independent pronoun (traditional, non-anaphoric). I 354 Prosentence: a prosentence never refers to a proposition (as an object of belief). ad I 352 (Prosentence/CGB/(s): a prosentence normally does not have an assertive force). See assertive force._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Grover, D. L.
> Counter arguments in relation to Prosentential Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28